a16z: With the frequent occurrence of violent crimes, how can blockchain practitioners protect their personal safety?

Author | Carl Agnelli (detailed author background introduction at the end)

Compilation | GaryMa Wu Talks Blockchain

Original link:

Imagine your family being kidnapped from your home, or you being forcibly shoved into a car by armed assailants, or even having your finger cut off by criminals as a ransom demand. These scenarios are disturbing, even cruel, but they are not hypothetical. These events have happened in reality — and are occurring to some individuals in the cryptocurrency space.

I want to share some practical experiences and lessons to help cryptocurrency founders, operators, and investors stay safe in this increasingly dangerous world. I will focus on two core areas of security: daily habits and violent crimes specific to the cryptocurrency industry. But first, I will start with some basic principles and a few real cases.

Why spend time discussing this? Founders, operators, and engineers focus on building the company, while investors are busy managing their portfolios. But if you don't consider security issues — personal safety — nothing else matters. This is not only about your own safety, but also about your team, family, and work. Security must be a part of your operating system.

I have worked in the security field for 35 years, including 25 years at the U.S. Secret Service, where I held multiple positions, including protecting every sitting U.S. president. I have also protected foreign heads of state (even those I do not agree with). The rules are simple: no one is allowed to die on U.S. soil.

But the Secret Service is not just responsible for protection. It is the only agency in the U.S. government with a dual mission of protection and investigation. Many of the world's top cyber investigators come from here. I have participated in global multinational investigations, monitored others, and have been monitored by others. You will learn many skills in this process, while becoming a master of observing human nature, learning how to interpret others, identify flaws, and recognize risks before threats occur.

1. Basic Principles of Personal Safety

Here are some guidelines:

1. Avoid conflicts as much as possible: If someone is behaving unusually, leave the scene. Change to another carriage, cross the street. Don't let your pride get in the way; your arrogance won't save you.

2. Trust your instincts: That feeling of unease does not come from nowhere. It is your autonomic nervous system warning you — increased heart rate, rapid breathing, sweating. This is your body trying to protect you. Listen to it.

3. Expect the unexpected: We call it “Murphy moments.” When things go wrong, they tend to escalate quickly. You can't predict every scenario, but you can mentally rehearse. “What if something happens?” is your best defense.

4. Invest in safety: We spend two hours reading Amazon reviews to choose a kettle. Spend five minutes learning how to secure your home when leaving.

5. Situational Awareness: Maintain “Yellow Status”:

At the Secret Service, we use color coding to describe the attention state of targets (that is you) in public places:

White: Unconsciousness, distraction — for example, walking with headphones on. Vulnerable.

Yellow: Relaxed alertness. Stay vigilant but not overly tense. This is the state you should maintain.

Orange: Heightened awareness — used in active threat scenarios.

Black: Panic, paralysis. You definitely do not want to enter this state.

At the Secret Service, we often say “leaning into the yellow,” which means maintaining a relaxed state of alertness. Train yourself to live in the yellow state. You don't need to be paranoid, just stay attentive.

You might notice someone on the train talking to themselves or wearing a thick coat in 30 degrees Celsius weather. You wouldn't panic, but you would choose to leave. You don't want to be in a white state — completely distracted, wearing headphones, engrossed in your phone. Even less do you want to enter a black state — paralyzed by panic.

Maintain yellow status.

3. Learn from Lessons: Two Personal Safety Cases

Case 1: Speaking Freely in Public

Last year, I attended a Formula One event in Miami. After the race, I went to a bar, not to party, but just to grab a burger and have a Diet Coke. I sat at a table by myself and noticed a man a few feet away. He was with three women, clearly having a good time and obviously a bit drunk.

His voice was loud, and there was a certain charm of a university student in his speech. But more importantly, he spoke incessantly. In less than a minute (I wasn’t eavesdropping on purpose, just sitting close), I learned his first name. A minute later, I heard his last name. The women were talking about their family backgrounds, and he mentioned his Irish heritage; someone made a spelling joke, and he corrected them. That’s how I learned his full name.

He was wearing a polo shirt embroidered with the company logo, belonging to a racing team. He also loudly mentioned his job: what he does and who he works for. Now I know his employer and position.

Next is the birthday topic. One woman is celebrating her birthday, and he interjects that his birthday just passed. She asks, “What day of the week?” He tells her. “You don't look 50,” one woman jokes. “Come on, I look great for 50,” he replies. So I learned his full birth date: month, day, year. My burger hasn't been served yet.

The topic shifted to where they lived. He casually mentioned that they all stayed at the same hotel. Then they talked about the views from their rooms: one woman could see the pool, while the other could see the street. He added, “We're all on the 18th floor, right?” They laughed and said they lived close to each other. Someone asked him which room he was in, and he stated it directly.

By this moment, I had already grasped his detailed information without even speaking to him: full name, employer and job function, date of birth, hotel, floor, room number.

If I were a person with ill intentions, I could confidently walk to the front desk and subtly employ social engineering tricks: “Hey, I've locked myself out of room XXX, my ID is upstairs, you can call my phone to confirm…” I could easily get the key. In the best-case scenario, I rob his room; in the worst-case scenario, he returns while I'm in the room.

Now, amplify this situation by 100 times. What if I am someone who deliberately targets him? What if I track him through public speeches and industry conferences, or simply search for him online just because he has some fame in the crypto field? All the information he freely leaks is precisely the fatal point that exposes people to risks.

He just wanted to make a good impression on a few people at the bar. But he leaked almost all the information that the company could use to verify identity: date of birth, name, place of work, room number. This information makes you very susceptible to attack.

Lesson: Assume that there are always people like me eavesdropping. Just know, you don’t have to worry about people like me — because unlike me, those eavesdroppers might really want to harm you. They are listening, looking for the next easy target. Don't let yourself become that target.

Case 2: Karl goes to watch the ice hockey game

I don't want to just criticize this drunken stranger in Miami. Let me tell a story about how I ignored all safety precautions myself.

My friends and I went to New Jersey to watch the Boston Bruins' playoff game. I was wearing a brand new Bruins jersey, underneath which I had on work clothes — a licensed handgun strapped to my waist. We were loud, having a great time, and probably said some things we shouldn't have. The Bruins won. After the game, I strutted through the parking lot like an early Conor McGregor.

I looked around and realized: my friends were gone. I was in a sea of red Devil's fans, and they were staring at me. I thought I should go back to the gym.

But I didn't. I kept moving forward.

A guy — — took off his red jersey, fuming — — and walked towards me. He looked around, scanning the area, just like we would do before a special ops mission. He was checking for police and exit points. I recognized these signals; I saw every single one of them. But I ignored them.

The guy walked straight up to me and punched me in the face. I fell to the ground, and he broke my nose. We wrestled with each other, worried he would take my gun, worried his friends would come around and stomp on me. I remember thinking at the time, “Is this how it ends for me? In a parking lot in East Rutherford, New Jersey?”

Suddenly, my brothers appeared. The scene was chaotic. They pulled me out. My face was covered in blood, and my nose was a mess. They asked, “How did you get beaten up like this?”

It's very simple. I put myself in danger and ignored all the signals. Lesson: This can happen to anyone — even to those who think they know how to protect themselves.

4. Maintain Safe Daily Habits

Many safe habits aren't flashy. They're not tactical gear or a Secret Service convoy. Rather, they are basic, and sometimes even a bit boring habits. If you can correctly develop these habits, you will be much safer than most people.

The following are some specific practices:

1. Do not walk alone after drinking: If you have to go alone, tell someone your plans. It's simple, but people always mess it up. You go out drinking, have a few drinks, and leave without saying goodbye to your friends, walking home alone. This happens all the time. If you drink, that's fine — but make sure someone knows where you're going, how you’re getting there, and when you’ll arrive. Text a friend, share your location, use your phone's location feature, or a dedicated tracking app. Do everything possible to ensure your safety.

2. Carry non-lethal deterrent tools — but you must have them in hand: for example, buy a flashlight with a strobe function. This is a real deterrent — but only if you are holding it. The same goes for pepper spray. If it's buried in your bag, it’s of no use. You need to have it in hand, ready to use, and know how to use it. Walking alone at night? Keep the deterrent tool in your hand.

3. Reduce distractions: If I had ill intentions, I could rob half the people on the train in New York. With headphones on, looking down at the screen, my backpack open, completely zoned out. This is the white state — a complete lack of awareness. You need to “maintain a yellow state.” Take off one headphone, look up, stay attentive. As long as you appear to be an alert person, it will be harder to become a target than for most people.

4. Try the Bond app for handling non-emergency situations: There is a significant gray area between “just feeling scared” and calling 911. The Bond app can fill this gap. Feeling uneasy with your rideshare driver or fellow passengers? Walking home late at night and feeling unsafe? Open the app, and within seconds you can be on a call with a real person trained in de-escalation. You can have them quietly accompany you during your journey, and they will stay on the line. They can track your route and contact emergency services if necessary. This is a game-changing tool that I recommend to every partner. There may be other similar services, but this is the one I use.

5. Practice the stairwell drill — Understand the exits: After I check into a hotel, I don't immediately drop my luggage and relax. I will locate the emergency stairwell and walk through it myself. Why? Because in a fire or emergency situation, elevators are not available, and people can panic. You don't want to discover during an emergency that the stairwell leads to unexpected places — or worse, that the door won't open. We always hear about the exit locations on airplanes and see the signs — why not do the same in other places where we stay longer? I've been in that situation before. Don't take it for granted. Know your exits.

6. Make a backup plan — meeting point when separated: This method has saved my life. I took my daughter to a packed Baltimore Orioles game. She was little at the time and wanted ice cream. We walked to get some, and when I turned around — she was gone. There were forty thousand people in the stadium. Panic set in quickly. But before we left, I told her, “If we get separated, wait for me by the statue.” Sure enough, there she was, hugging her little teddy bear. You should have the same plan when you go out with friends or family: “If something goes wrong, let's meet here.” It's that simple.

7. Check the hotel room mirror: This is a bit niche, but it is indeed a problem. When I travel — especially abroad — I always check the mirror. Press a pen or sharp object against the glass. If there is a gap between the tip of the pen and the reflection, it’s fine. If there’s no gap? It might be a two-way mirror. I have encountered this situation twice, both in high-risk countries. If the mirror is problematic, request a room change.

8. Put essentials in the hotel safe: Have you ever forgotten your passport or wallet in the hotel safe when checking out? This happens quite often. My trick is to put something I absolutely need in the safe — like one shoe. The next morning when getting dressed and realizing I'm missing a shoe, I will immediately think of the safe.

These are not complex strategies, just smart habits. If you stick to them, you will be ten steps ahead of most people.

5. Unique Threats of Cryptocurrencies

The daily habits mentioned above are practices that everyone should follow. But let's not sugarcoat reality: if you are in the cryptocurrency industry, you are a target. Founders, engineers, early employees — if someone thinks you might hold digital assets or have influence over the protocol, they may come after you. These individuals are not petty thieves, but often organized, sophisticated criminals. Many times, they are also quite violent.

This is not theory, but a real threat that you must be vigilant about at all times.

These are not random robberies — they are meticulously planned acts of brutality.

Not long ago, a cryptocurrency founder in the UK was robbed at gunpoint (in a country where gun crime is rare). The attackers did not choose him by chance. They had a plan, tracked him, studied him, and then struck.

Another case involves the co-founder of a cryptocurrency wallet company. He and his wife were being monitored. The attackers tracked them, waited for the right moment, and then kidnapped them. They took the founder to another location, cut off one of his fingers, and sent a video to his co-founder to prove their seriousness. This was not just robbery, but terror.

There is also a case in Toronto involving the CEO of an international crypto asset platform company. On the night after the U.S. election — when Bitcoin prices soared — he was grabbed off the street. The attackers observed his daily activities and meticulously planned. In the end, he handed over cryptocurrency worth millions of dollars.

These are just documented cases. There are many more cases you will never hear about.

Not only celebrities will become targets.

It's not always the CEO or the protocol founder who is attacked. Sometimes, attackers target those who boast online.

There was a young man in Portland — not famous and unprotected. He liked to show off on Twitter, talking about how much cryptocurrency he had, what he bought, and where he was going. A gang from Florida saw these posts, flew to Portland, kidnapped him, took everything, and left him tied to a fence.

He wasn't even on anyone's radar before. Just by showing off loudly, he made himself a target.

Why are cryptocurrencies particularly fragile?

Why is this happening?

1. External perception: People believe that as long as you are in the crypto industry, you are very wealthy. Whether this is true or not doesn't matter, what matters is that criminals believe it.

2. Inadequate infrastructure: Early startups often lack security teams. You might be managing millions of dollars in assets and building protocols, but your lifestyle still resembles that of a college student. This is a problem.

3. Criminals do not understand cryptocurrency: they are unaware that wallets are traceable and funds may be frozen. They only think that obtaining your keys means they've won.

4. No “undo” button: If the criminal gets hold of your mnemonic phrase, sufficient shares of your multi-signature key, or the password and access to your hardware wallet? It's all over. There’s no help line, no fraud department.

These attacks did not happen overnight. The criminals' operations have their processes:

Targeting: Usually through public channels — podcasts, social media, conferences, and even guest lists for parties.

Establishing a profile: They start to gather everything: your name, habits, digital footprint. Who you live with, who you work with.

Leverage the people around you: housekeepers, contractors, ride-hailing drivers — anyone who can get close to you.

Study your daily routine: this is called “lifestyle monitoring.” The time you leave home, the route you take, where you eat, and your alone time.

Choose a location: usually your home, because they understand the layout, can control the environment, and can buy time.

This action requires effort. But because of this, as long as you stay vigilant, you will be able to notice.

6. What can you do

Setting up a secondary wallet: You might know this ironic fact: you spent years building unbreakable crypto technology, only to have some guy threaten you with a $5 wrench to hand over your seed phrase.

Harsh reality: If someone has taken you, encryption technology won't save you. Your cold storage laptop won't save you. Your multi-signature mechanism is good, but if someone attacks you, it won't help at all.

Therefore, I told each collaborating founder: set up a secondary wallet. Make it look real, put in some funds, give it transaction records, make it seem authentic. If the situation becomes critical, hand over this wallet. It’s not a real vault, just enough to pass off as genuine.

How much capital to put in? It depends on you. 10%? 5%? It should feel painful to part with, but not lethal.

Because if someone has spent weeks planning to kidnap you, they won't leave empty-handed. But if they get something, they are more likely to just walk away. They want to get out as quickly as you do. You don't want to get into a deadlock. You need to give them what they want and end it quickly.

If they knew — or even suspected — that you had more? Then things would be even worse.

Delete your online traces: You don't need to be paranoid, but you should stay low-key. We recommend using services like DeleteMe to reduce your digital footprint. Use a trust when buying a house. Don't provide attackers with a map.

Installing home security cameras and motion lights: No need to spend tens of thousands of dollars. Basic setup — install motion lights and Ring cameras at the front and back doors — can make a huge difference. No one can approach your house without triggering the alarm. The motion lights buy you time, while the cameras enhance your awareness. If someone is scouting and sees these setups, they are likely to turn to another target. Most people will choose the easier target over the difficult one. This is basic protection. If you're in the crypto industry, you should have these already.

Diversify funds: Use different platforms, do not link everything together. Too many people put all their assets in one place. Worse, they manage multiple accounts with the same email, device, or recovery protocol. This is a disaster. If someone hacks one account and can trace other accounts, you are done for. Cut the connections. Use different services, diversify wallets, platforms, devices — everything. The harder it is to trace the connections, the safer you are.

Practice the “hypothetical” game: this is very useful. I often do this. When I walk into a restaurant, I think: “If someone with a gun comes in right now, where would I go? What could I use?” On a plane, I imagine: “What if something goes wrong?” In the Secret Service, we train like this all the time. Visualization is key. Ask yourself: “If someone bursts in right now, what is my first move? Where is the cover? Where is the concealment? Can I get out?” You never want to be thinking about these things for the first time when something happens.

Understanding the exit, familiarizing myself with the stairwell, and preparing an “emergency chair”: in case of an emergency, the hotel is in chaos. The fire alarm goes off, people are in bathrobes, barefoot, and panicking with their laptops. Don't be that person. After I check into a hotel, I immediately find the emergency stairwell and walk through it. I need to know not only where it is but also where it leads. You'd be surprised to find that some stairwells don't lead to where you expect. I also prepare an “emergency chair” — I set aside workout clothes and sneakers for quick access. If the fire alarm goes off in the middle of the night, I can get dressed and out the door in 30 seconds instead of in a flurry.

Don't rely on your phone to help you reconnect: make a separation plan. Phones can run out of battery, signals can drop, especially in a disaster. You can't treat your phone as your only lifeline. When going out with a partner, team, or friends, you need a separation plan. Before you head out, say it out loud: “If something goes wrong and we get separated, let's meet here.” It doesn't need to be complicated. My three-year-old daughter can do it at the baseball field, and so can you. Make a plan every time.

VII. Conclusion

If you really get caught, it will be too late to regret not considering these things. That's why situational awareness is crucial. Your best defense is prevention. Stay in a yellow state, develop good habits, and be prepared.

ps: Carl Agnelli is the Head of Security at a16z crypto, responsible for the security and protection of a16z crypto employees, facilities, and events globally. Before joining a16z, Carl Agnelli served as the Chief Security Officer at Citigroup. Prior to that, he served as an agent for 25 years at the United States Secret Service. In Washington D.C., he was responsible for global security operations and provided personal protection for Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Carl Agnelli also served as the head of the Secret Service's Northeastern region, overseeing security measures for major events involving the U.S. President and visiting foreign dignitaries.