Starlink hits a snag in Taiwan over “100% wholly owned” status! The Legislative Yuan fiercely debates loosening regulations on low Earth orbit satellites, with concerns that Elon Musk’s pro-China stance could become a national security loophole.

Starlink’s arrival in Taiwan: Why the delay?
On April 22, the Legislative Yuan’s Transportation Committee focused on the issue of easing restrictions on low Earth orbit satellites.
Faced with Starlink’s firm stance of “100% foreign ownership,” Taiwan’s current Telecommunications Management Act’s foreign ownership cap has become the biggest obstacle.
NCC and the Digital Development Department emphasized that there may be no need for drastic legal amendments; flexible mechanisms like trade agreements could resolve the issue, but only if data sovereignty and cybersecurity are ensured.
Lawmakers are fiercely debating between “disaster communication resilience” and “Elon Musk’s China-related concerns.”
(Background: Starlink has also been interfered with by Iran; how does Jack Dorsey’s “Bitchat” break through via Bluetooth networks?)
(Additional background: SpaceX is accused of not providing “Starshield satellite services” to Taiwan; U.S. lawmakers criticize Musk for endangering Taiwan-U.S. security.)

Table of Contents

Toggle

• Regulatory Walls and Starlink’s “Uncompromising” Stance
• NCC: No Urgent Need to Amend Laws, Existing Mechanisms Are Flexible
• Diverging Opinions Among Lawmakers: Communication Resilience vs. Musk Risks
• Taiwan’s Alternatives: Multi-Track Approaches and a Taiwan-Style Starlink

In the context of modern warfare and frequent natural disasters, low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites have become a strategic infrastructure for building “communication resilience” among nations.
However, the globally dominant Starlink by SpaceX has yet to officially land in Taiwan.

On April 22, 2026, the Legislative Yuan’s Transportation Committee held an intense discussion on “Easing Restrictions on Starlink’s Entry into Taiwan.”
This meeting revealed the complex three-way tug-of-war among regulatory restrictions, commercial negotiations, and national security.

Regulatory Walls and Starlink’s “Uncompromising” Stance

The biggest obstacle preventing Starlink from entering Taiwan’s consumer market lies in Article 36 of the Telecommunications Management Act:
Telecom operators must be domestic companies, with foreign ownership not exceeding 49%, and total direct and indirect foreign ownership not exceeding 60%.

Digital Development Minister Lin Yi-ching pointed out the core contradiction:
Compared to OneWeb and Amazon’s Kuiper, which are willing to accept a “代理商” (agent) model in cooperation with local telecom providers, Starlink’s attitude is extremely firm, preferring to establish a 100% foreign-owned company in Taiwan.
This is a significant divergence from current laws.
Additionally, Lin revealed that Taiwan’s 4G/5G penetration has exceeded 99%, and in Starlink’s commercial assessment, Taiwan’s “additional value” is limited, so it is not prioritized for deployment.

NCC: No Urgent Need to Amend Laws, Existing Mechanisms Are Flexible

In response to calls for comprehensive legal amendments to accommodate Starlink, NCC Acting Chair Chen Chong-shu offered an alternative solution.
He stated that the current laws “can be operated within,” and there may be no need for drastic amendments.

NCC pointed out that, by referencing Japan and Korea’s relaxed models, Taiwan can fully leverage diplomatic mechanisms like the “Taiwan-U.S. Trade Agreement” to exempt foreign ownership restrictions.
However, openness has its limits.
Allowing purely foreign companies to operate independently without local participation could pose risks:

• Data Sovereignty and National Security:
  Require foreign investors to set up ground stations (Gateways) locally.
• Cybersecurity and Fraud Prevention:
  Starlink devices have previously been exploited by scam groups; allowing only foreign ownership would significantly increase the difficulty of communication regulation and crime prevention.

Diverging Opinions Among Lawmakers: Communication Resilience vs. Musk Risks

This issue has sparked fierce debate among ruling and opposition legislators.

Including Huang Jian-hao and Ge Ru-jun, opposition lawmakers advocate for quick relaxation through project approval or legal amendments.
They emphasize that if Taiwan’s submarine cables are cut during wartime or natural disasters, low Earth orbit satellites will be the only lifeline.
With neighboring countries like Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines already adopting Starlink (Japan has even opened retail stores to sell equipment directly), Taiwan’s progress is severely lagging, risking widening the urban-rural digital gap.

However, another faction of lawmakers raises a deeper “trust crisis.”
Given Elon Musk’s past remarks often labeled as “pro-China,” if Taiwan’s critical wartime command and communication infrastructure are entirely handed over to a foreign company controlled by Musk, it would be a serious threat to national security.

Taiwan’s Alternatives: Multi-Track Approaches and a Taiwan-Style Starlink

In the face of Starlink’s slow landing, the Taiwanese government is not putting all eggs in one basket.
Currently, Taiwan’s low Earth orbit satellite deployment adopts a “multi-track” strategy:

2. Introducing other foreign companies:
   Chunghwa Telecom’s代理的 OneWeb has established 773 ground stations nationwide and successfully tested during the recent Hualien earthquake;
   Amazon Kuiper is also scheduled to start service this year.
3. Developing a “Taiwan version of Starlink”:
   The government plans to invest about NT$40 billion over ten years to develop indigenous low Earth orbit satellites.
   Currently, the satellite hardware’s domestic component rate has reached 60% to 80%, ensuring true technological and communication independence.

At present, the short-term prospects for Starlink’s landing in Taiwan still depend on mutual concessions.
Unless breakthroughs are made in the Taiwan-U.S. trade agreement or Starlink is willing to compromise on conditions like establishing ground stations and involving local operators, the final bottom line for the Taiwanese government will be conditional project approval under national security and legal considerations.