Can China serve as a guarantor for a ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran?

Writing by: George

In theory, the United States and Iran can find common ground on a ceasefire issue. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is not a fanatic religious organization but a利益集团 that monopolizes violence, with core demands: 1. Ensure their own security; 2. Continue earning money by exporting oil. For the US, its core demands can also be summarized as two points: 1. Iran must not acquire nuclear weapons; 2. Ensure freedom of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

It can be seen that there are no irreconcilable conflicts between Iran and the US regarding their core demands. Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is driven by fears of a full-scale invasion by the US. If the US ceases hostility toward Iran, Iran would be willing to denuclearize in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions. However, in reality, US-Iran negotiations have been full of twists and turns, almost hitting a dead end. The root cause lies in Iran’s lack of trust in Trump; over the past decade, Trump has repeatedly torn up agreements and launched preemptive strikes against Iran. Therefore, even if the Trump administration promises not to launch a second invasion, Iran would not easily believe it.

During World War II, Nazi Germany tore up the Munich Agreement and invaded Czechoslovakia outright. This move led to the complete collapse of Hitler’s diplomatic credibility, and the appeasement policy of Britain and France lost its voice. Trump often treats diplomacy as a game, and his diplomatic credibility is not much better than Hitler’s, which raises the threshold for US-Iran talks. If the US wants Iran to believe in its diplomatic commitments, the only way is to have Trump step down and have Van der Leyen form a new government to negotiate with Iran.

As long as Trump remains president, Iran will not believe in the US’s sincerity for peace. In this situation, there are only two ways to achieve peace: 1. Escalate the war, relying on military means to decide the outcome; 2. Have a third party mediate to balance the interests of all sides. If it’s the first, the consequences are unpredictable, and neither US nor Iran has an absolute chance of victory. If it’s the second, China might play a key role.

Generally speaking, when Country A and Country B go to war, there are three ways to mediate:

1. Neutral mediation; suppose Country C is strong enough and maintains good relations with both A and B. In this case, A and B, trusting C, are willing to let C act as arbitrator. A typical example is China’s mediation between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, where both countries chose Beijing as the negotiation venue because China has good relations with both.

2. Pressure mediation; Country C can exert pressure, forcing A to accept a ceasefire agreement, or C will side with B to jointly oppose A. In return, B must concede interests to C. A classic example is the 1895 “Three Emperors’ Intervention,” where Russia pressured Japan to return Liaodong Peninsula to China. As a “reward,” Russia gained the right to build railways in Manchuria.

3. Guarantee mediation; if B lacks trust in A, C can intervene and provide mutual guarantees. Once A breaches the agreement in the future, C will support B to dispel B’s concerns about the ceasefire. As compensation for the guarantee, A and B must pay C a “reward,” such as diplomatic concessions. After Trump took office, he tried to act as a guarantor for Russia-Ukraine negotiations, overseeing ceasefire enforcement. In exchange, the US demanded European concessions on tariffs and sought overseas benefits from Russia.

Specifically regarding US-Iran ceasefire negotiations, the neutral mediation model is less applicable. During Merkel’s tenure, the EU served as a mediator between US and Iran, promoting the Iran Nuclear Deal in 2015. After the Russia-Ukraine war broke out, Europe became heavily dependent on US security, losing its neutral position between US and Iran, making it unsuitable to continue as a mediator. Similar to late 19th-century Germany mediating between Austria-Hungary and Russia, maintaining the “Triple Alliance,” but as Germany’s foreign policy tilted more toward Austria-Hungary, Russia shifted alliances to France. Currently, India maintains good relations with both US and Iran, but India’s influence in international affairs is weak, making it unlikely for Iran and the US to accept India as an arbitrator.

If pressure mediation is considered, the most likely mediators are the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). For example, Saudi Arabia and the UAE might issue an ultimatum to Iran, demanding the lifting of the Strait blockade, or GCC members will declare war on Iran. However, relying solely on GCC pressure may be insufficient to make Iran compromise, as Iran has the capability to attack its desalination plants on a large scale, and a real conflict would only result in mutual destruction.

Therefore, the most feasible approach is guarantee mediation, with China and Russia acting as mediators to push for a long-term ceasefire agreement between the US and Iran. Russia has previously attempted to serve as a guarantor of the Iran Nuclear Deal, offering to safeguard Iran’s enriched uranium in exchange for US pressure on Ukraine to cede territory. However, regarding the Strait blockade, Russia is reluctant to intervene extensively; high oil prices can ease its fiscal pressure, and Putin prefers prolonging the conflict.

Thus, China might be the only country capable and motivated to provide guarantee mediation for the US-Iran conflict. Currently, the main obstacle in US-Iran negotiations is Iran’s distrust of US promises. China could offer Iran security guarantees, such as providing self-defense weapons if Trump later breaches the deal and launches a second invasion. As a reward for guarantees, the US would need to make concessions elsewhere, such as freezing arms sales to Taiwan, halting support for the DPP authorities, and restraining Japan’s rearmament. On the other hand, Iran, continuing to export discounted oil to China, should cooperate with China to repair relations with the GCC and ensure the normal passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

In this process, China’s cost is the risk of providing security guarantees to Iran, while the main benefit is the potential geopolitical concessions from the US. If the benefits of US geopolitical concessions outweigh the risks of guaranteeing Iran’s security, such guarantees are worthwhile. But whether the US is willing to trade with China to end the war remains uncertain.

From the US perspective, without considering sunk costs, the optimal solution is to use military force to open the Strait of Hormuz, gaining control of the Persian Gulf. Although this could entail significant costs, as long as it preserves the empire’s credibility and the “petroleum-dollar” system, such costs are justified.

However, from Trump’s perspective, personal interests and US national interests clearly diverge. Trump’s optimal solution is: without deploying ground troops, Iran voluntarily lifts the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, allowing the White House to frame the withdrawal as a victory. As long as oil prices fall, Trump can regain middle-class voters; as long as US troops suffer no major casualties, he can reassure MAGA supporters. This could give Trump a chance to salvage his midterm election prospects.

Based on US interests, it is unlikely to make concessions to China to end the war; but based on Trump’s interests, he might trade national interests for personal gains. Therefore, if we can exploit the contradiction between Trump’s personal interests and US national interests, China could consider mediating the US-Iran conflict to profit from the spread. Such conflicts of interest are common in publicly listed companies, where executives pursue aggressive expansion for hefty bonuses, but the risks are borne collectively by shareholders. Trump, as a “professional manager” of the US, might prioritize family interests over national interests.

However, this kind of guarantee mediation also carries other risks. On one hand, US foreign policy is unpredictable; to prevent being dragged into the Middle East quagmire, China should limit the validity period of guarantees to Trump’s tenure. On the other hand, the current conflicts between the GCC and Iran are very sharp, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE advocating for short-term pain rather than long-term suffering, attempting to leverage US power to change Iran’s regime. Therefore, guarantees to Iran should include key clauses: Iran must cooperate with China, actively repair relations with the GCC, maintain the Strait’s open passage, and prevent further escalation.

If the US refuses to make geopolitical concessions, or Iran is unwilling to cooperate diplomatically, China should not intervene in US-Iran mediation. The Strait blockade concerns all humanity; if Japan, South Korea, India, and Europe hide behind and do not contribute, relying solely on China to bear the risks of mediation is inappropriate. The longer the Strait remains blocked, the greater the impact on these countries, and they can simply wait and see.