DeadLock Ransomware Uses Code to Evade Traditional Takedown Methods via Polygon Blockchain

Security researchers have uncovered an innovative and concerning technique where a ransomware operation leverages Polygon smart contracts to maintain persistent command-and-control infrastructure that effectively evades conventional takedown efforts. The code-based approach represents a significant shift in how cybercriminals can weaponize blockchain technology for criminal purposes.

Group-IB, a leading cybersecurity research firm, published findings on January 15 detailing how the DeadLock ransomware strain—first observed in mid-2025—employs this novel method. Unlike traditional ransomware operations that rely on centralized servers vulnerable to disruption, this threat utilizes publicly accessible smart contracts to store and manage rotating proxy addresses, creating a distributed architecture that proves extremely difficult to disable.

How Ransomware Code Evades Detection Through Blockchain

The technical approach is deceptively simple yet highly effective. Once DeadLock infiltrates a victim’s system and executes its encryption payload, the malware contains embedded code programmed to query a specific Polygon smart contract at regular intervals. This contract functions as a dynamic configuration store, holding current proxy server addresses that facilitate communication channels between the attackers and compromised systems.

The elegance of this architecture lies in its decentralized nature. Attackers can update proxy addresses within the smart contract at any moment, allowing them to continuously rotate their infrastructure without requiring malware redeployment across victim machines. Critically, the ransomware only performs read operations on the blockchain—victims generate no transactions and incur no gas fees. This read-only characteristic ensures the operation remains stealthy and economically efficient.

The proxy rotation mechanism essentially creates a resilient, self-updating communication backbone that traditional law enforcement takedown procedures cannot easily sever. Each proxy change occurs on-chain, immutably recorded yet immediately functional, leaving defenders perpetually chasing shifting targets.

Why This Code Strategy Evades Conventional Defense

The threat model fundamentally differs from legacy ransomware infrastructure. Traditional command-and-control servers, while vulnerable to disruption and seizure, operate from identifiable locations. Law enforcement can track, identify, and shut down these centralized resources. Polygon’s distributed blockchain architecture eliminates this vulnerability point entirely.

Because smart contract data remains replicated across thousands of distributed nodes worldwide, there exists no single point of failure. Disabling one proxy address proves futile when the malware automatically retrieves updated addresses from an immutable smart contract. The infrastructure achieves unprecedented resilience through decentralization—a quality that renders conventional takedown procedures largely ineffective.

Group-IB’s analysis identified multiple smart contracts linked to this campaign that were deployed or updated between late 2025 and early 2026, confirming ongoing operational activity. The firm estimated a limited victim pool at present, with no confirmed connections to established ransomware affiliate networks or public data leak platforms.

Critical Distinction: Code Misuse Versus Protocol Vulnerability

Researchers emphasized a crucial clarification: DeadLock does not exploit weaknesses in Polygon itself, nor does it compromise third-party smart contracts operated by DeFi protocols, crypto wallets, or bridge services. The operation neither discovers nor leverages any zero-day vulnerabilities or protocol flaws.

Instead, the threat actor exploits what is fundamentally a feature of public blockchains—the transparent, immutable, publicly readable nature of on-chain data. This technique bears conceptual similarity to earlier “EtherHiding” attacks that similarly leveraged blockchain’s inherent characteristics rather than technological failures.

The distinction matters considerably for the broader ecosystem. Polygon users face no direct technical risk from protocol compromise. The blockchain functions exactly as designed. However, the case demonstrates how public ledgers can be repurposed to support criminal infrastructure in ways that circumvent traditional security countermeasures.

Implications for Threat Landscape Evolution

While current DeadLock operations remain relatively contained, cybersecurity experts warn that the methodology possesses significant replication potential. The technique is inexpensive to implement, requires no specialized infrastructure, and proves difficult to systematically block or counter. Should more established ransomware groups or criminal enterprises adopt similar approaches, the security implications could escalate dramatically.

The code-based strategy essentially democratizes resilient command-and-control infrastructure, putting powerful evasion techniques within reach of even modestly resourced threat actors. As blockchain technology proliferates across multiple networks and Layer 2 solutions expand, opportunities for similar misuse will likely multiply.

Group-IB’s disclosure serves as an early-warning indicator that the intersection of ransomware sophistication and blockchain utility creates novel attack vectors requiring fresh defensive thinking and proactive monitoring. The case underscores how public blockchain transparency, while beneficial for legitimate applications, simultaneously enables creative approaches for threat actors determined to evade code-based and infrastructure-focused defensive measures.