The $275M A.K. Group Fraud: Inside the Call-Center Scam That Caught Marcel Deschamps Twice

When Marcel Deschamps lost $200,000 in crypto, he thought his nightmare was over. It had just begun. A caller promised recovery—all he needed to do was send $3,500 as proof of investment. Deschamps complied, only to realize he’d been victimized again by the same criminal network.

This wasn’t isolated. Behind the scenes, a sprawling fraud operation known as A.K. Group had systematized deception to an industrial scale, victimizing 32,000 people across multiple continents and extracting $275 million through coordinated call-center schemes.

How Marcel Deschamps Became a Double Victim

Marcel Deschamps’ case exemplifies a common pattern: the recovery scam. Fraudsters target previous crypto victims with promises of asset retrieval. The premise is simple but effective—exploit desperation. By the time Deschamps realized what happened, he’d already wired money to a second criminal entity.

The scammer identified as “Mary Roberts” was actually Mariam Charchian, a top earner within the A.K. Group hierarchy. When Deschamps confronted her about the fraud, her response was chillingly candid: “I can scam whoever I want, and it’s not your business.” This wasn’t a momentary lapse in judgment—it reflected the operational culture of an organization that had normalized large-scale theft.

A.K. Group’s Sophisticated Fraud Operation

What distinguished A.K. Group wasn’t just scale, but infrastructure. Operating from Georgia, the organization maintained call centers equipped with HR departments, IT support systems, and CRM software designed specifically to track and manage victims. This wasn’t opportunistic crime—it was systematized fraud operating with corporate efficiency.

The group’s employees earned salaries based on successful “conversions” (victims defrauded), and internal hierarchy reflected a fully functional business structure. They treated their victim database as a legitimate asset, complete with tracking metrics and follow-up protocols.

From Hidden Identities to Exposed Data

The operation’s exposure came through a massive data breach that revealed the infrastructure underlying the fraud. Internal records disclosed employee identities, salary structures, communications, and shopping records—a digital footprint documenting the organization’s systematic theft.

Following the breach, A.K. Group’s response was to disappear. Office locations emptied, social media accounts were deleted, and the operation went dark. Georgian authorities acknowledged awareness of the situation but took no observable action, exemplifying the jurisdictional challenges law enforcement faces in prosecuting transnational crypto fraud.

What This Means for Crypto Investors

Marcel Deschamps’ experience illustrates a critical security principle: recovery promises from unsolicited callers are almost invariably fraudulent. Legitimate recovery services don’t contact victims through cold calls. Once funds are stolen in crypto transactions, they’re typically irretrievable through official channels—making recovery schemes universally deceptive.

The scale of A.K. Group’s operation—$275 million from 32,000 victims—demonstrates that crypto fraud remains highly profitable, incentivizing criminal organizations to continue targeting this sector. Until regulatory frameworks strengthen and law enforcement gains transnational capabilities, investor vigilance remains the primary defense.