Bitcoin quantum threat countdown! Willy Woo's foolproof guide: SegWit wallets saved for 7 years

Bitcoin veteran Willy Woo proposes a method to protect Bitcoin from quantum threats—storing Bitcoin in SegWit wallets for about seven years. Quantum computing has long been a concern in the crypto industry as a potential turning point, capable of cracking encryption and leaking user keys, thereby exposing user funds. Woo believes that SegWit can hide public keys until transactions are recorded, whereas traditional addresses embed the public key into the address, making them more vulnerable to quantum attacks.

Willy Woo’s Interim Solution for SegWit

(Source: Bitcoin Org)

On November 11, Woo published an article on X (formerly Twitter), proposing an “interim measure”: transferring users’ Bitcoin to addresses compatible with SegWit and holding it there until a quantum-secure protocol is developed. SegWit, or Segregated Witness, is an upgrade to the Bitcoin protocol implemented on August 23, 2017. Originally designed to fix transaction malleability and increase block capacity, Woo now suggests it as a temporary solution against Bitcoin’s quantum threat.

Woo argues that quantum computers can distinguish between private and public keys, and current main addresses “embed the public key into the address,” making them susceptible to quantum attacks. In contrast, SegWit hides the public key until a transaction is recorded on the blockchain. This design difference is central to Woo’s proposed strategy.

“Previously, protecting private keys (mnemonics) was the main concern. But in the upcoming era of large-scale quantum computers (BSQC), you also need to protect the public key,” he said. “Earlier formats hide the public key behind a hash, making it difficult for BSQC to crack it.” This argument is based on the differing attack capabilities of quantum computers on various encryption algorithms, with hash functions being more resistant to quantum attacks than elliptic curve cryptography.

Woo’s plan requires Bitcoin users to avoid sending any Bitcoin from SegWit addresses until a quantum-safe solution is developed. This means treating SegWit addresses as “cold storage,” only depositing into them and not withdrawing for the next 7 years. Although this sacrifices liquidity, Woo sees it as a necessary price to protect assets from Bitcoin’s quantum threat.

Institutional Investors’ Quantum Defense Advantage

Woo also acknowledges that if custodial institutions take action—even before anti-quantum protocols are launched—Bitcoin held in exchange-traded funds, treasury holdings, and cold storage may already have quantum resistance. This highlights an asymmetry between retail investors and institutions in facing Bitcoin’s quantum threat.

Institutions typically use professional custody services that may already deploy multi-signature setups, hardware security modules (HSMs), and other advanced security measures. When the threat becomes real, these institutions have the resources and technical capacity to upgrade to quantum-safe infrastructure first. In contrast, retail investors rely on open-source wallets and self-custody, making upgrades more complex and slower.

This gap could have serious consequences if Bitcoin faces a quantum threat: if only institutions can protect their assets in time, while retail Bitcoin holdings are exposed, it could trigger widespread panic selling, further destabilizing the market. Woo’s SegWit approach aims to offer retail investors a simple, feasible way to safeguard their assets, helping to address this asymmetry.

He also notes that “general consensus” suggests quantum technology may not threaten Bitcoin before 2030, and that standards and upgrades for quantum resistance are already underway. This timeframe provides a window for action but also raises debates about whether more urgent measures are needed.

Charles Edwards’s Criticism

Charles Edwards, founder of quantitative Bitcoin and digital asset fund Carpriole, has warned about the quantum threat to Bitcoin. He strongly questions Woo’s solution, claiming it “lacks quantum security.” Edwards’s critique hits at the core of Woo’s technical proposal.

“SegWit is not a protective mechanism. We need to upgrade the network as soon as possible, and the suggestion that we have 7 years is a sign that the network will collapse first,” he said. Edwards argues that SegWit only delays the exposure of public keys; once a transaction occurs, the public key is recorded on the blockchain, and quantum computers could attack these exposed keys.

More critically, Edwards believes Woo’s 7-year timeframe is overly optimistic. “Bitcoin can adapt, but we need to see much more progress now; only next year can we reach real consensus. Bitcoin is the most vulnerable network in the world.” This challenges the mainstream “before 2030” safety consensus and advocates for more aggressive preventative measures.

Controversy Over the SegWit Solution

Proponents (Woo): SegWit’s public key hiding offers temporary protection; users should immediately transfer assets and cease transactions for 7 years.

Opponents (Edwards): SegWit is not truly quantum-safe; immediate protocol upgrades are necessary rather than delaying responses.

This divide reflects two risk management philosophies within the crypto community regarding Bitcoin’s quantum threat: one favors gradual adaptation using existing tools to buy time; the other advocates for radical change through immediate protocol overhaul.

Critics Claim Quantum Panic Is Overblown

Meanwhile, critics argue that the quantum threat to Bitcoin is exaggerated because the technology is still decades away from being practically feasible. They see current discussions about Bitcoin’s quantum vulnerability as largely theoretical, with the real threat far off.

These critics point out that major banks and other traditional targets will be compromised long before Bitcoin. Modern financial systems rely on RSA and elliptic curve encryption; if quantum computers can break these, banks, governments, and corporations’ sensitive data would be first to be affected. Bitcoin, as a decentralized asset, is just one of many potential targets, and its economic incentives for attack are less compelling compared to centralized financial institutions.

Furthermore, quantum computer development faces significant technical hurdles. The most advanced quantum computers currently have only a few hundred qubits with high error rates. Cracking Bitcoin’s secp256k1 elliptic curve encryption would require millions of stable, error-corrected qubits—an achievement likely 20 to 30 years away or more.

The Bitcoin community is not unprepared. Research into post-quantum cryptography has been ongoing for years, and in 2024, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) plans to release initial post-quantum cryptographic standards. These algorithms could be integrated into Bitcoin protocols, allowing upgrades before the quantum threat becomes imminent.