Overwork in the front, executive sexual harassment in the back—Chery's distorted corporate culture behind the sales decline

（Source: Feikan Finance and Economics）

01

Another Chery! This time it’s executive workplace sexual harassment

Recently, a statement stamped with a red seal exploded within the auto industry and workplace communities.

A post-2000s female employee published a real-name complaint letter online addressed to Yin Tongyue, Chairman of Chery Holding Group, putting Jiang Wenbo, General Manager of the Chery Commercial Vehicle Ecosystem Business Unit, in the spotlight.

In the complaint letter, the employee gave a detailed account of the entire process after she joined the company in April 2025—over more than half a year—during which she was continuously subjected to workplace sexual harassment and bullying by Jiang Wenbo.

From sending flirtatious messages late at night like “I miss you,” to frequently making harassing phone calls, to calling her into a separately locked office and carrying out physical contact such as groping and pinching her ears—there were numerous incidents.

Jiang Wenbo even required his female subordinate to shave his face and to handle small, personal-secretary-type tasks. If she did not comply even slightly, she would face verbal suppression and workplace retaliation.

Even more shocking is that the complaint letter explicitly mentions that Jiang Wenbo’s harassment was not directed solely at her personally; multiple female colleagues within the department had also experienced similar boundary-crossing behavior.

And earlier, employees had reported related issues internally, but they did not receive any handling. Instead, Jiang Wenbo was promoted all the way, and in multiple Chery-affiliated companies he served as a legal representative or director, including:

Legal representative and director of Haoyong Ecological Technology (Anhui) Co., Ltd.;

Director and manager of Haoyong Auto Leasing Co., Ltd.;

Legal representative and executive director of Suzhou Xinruitu New Energy Vehicle Technology Co., Ltd.;

Legal representative of Shenzhen Kaixin Auto Leasing Co., Ltd.

After the incident gained momentum, Chery’s response speed could hardly be said to be slow: it received the real-name complaint on March 28, completed the internal investigation by March 31, dismissed the implicated executive Jiang Wenbo and terminated his labor contract, and on April 1 it issued a statement through official channels, emphasizing “zero tolerance” for actions that infringe employees’ rights and pledging to improve internal management mechanisms and strengthen protections for employees’ rights.

From the complaint letter being released to public opinion roaring and then to the matter being carried out on the ground, it took only three days. The rapid dismissal operation appears to show Chery’s decisive approach to public opinion, but it failed to calm doubts in the public discourse.

A manager had serious flaws in ethics and conduct, yet still could thrive within the organization—this can only mean that this company’s evaluation mechanism has problems, or put another way, that at certain times performance and “being agreeable” became the standard for everything.

A results-only orientation is by no means uncommon in Chery’s internal management logic. We roll the timeline back to 2023: an internal email from Gao Xinhua, Chery’s Executive Vice President, once made the entire auto industry turn heads.

“Saturday is a normal working day for strivers” was written in black and white, requiring employees to actively apply for overtime. Once the news came out, public outrage followed again, and the label of the “896” work system was firmly pinned on Chery.

It was not until July 2025 that Yin Tongyue, at the mid-year cadres conference, finally publicly admitted that the management in the past had been too crude, with issues such as too many meetings and encroachment on weekends—he bowed on the spot and apologized.

When a company has long been trapped in high-pressure, anxiety-driven overwork, managers’ power will expand without limits, employees at the grassroots will have their rights squeezed without limits, and ultimately this distorted management culture will inevitably release itself from some of the most disgraceful corners.

02

A cutting-edge brand’s complete collapse

If management-layer scandals merely popped the pus bubble of Chery’s internal culture, then the sales figures directly reflect Chery’s most real survival situation right now.

On April 1, 2026—on the very same day it released the statement about the sexual harassment incident—Chery Automobile also released its March sales quick report.

At first glance, the numbers still look decent: total Chery Automobile sales in March were 228,451 units, up 15% year over year; cumulative sales for the first quarter were 566,100 units. But if you are an investor who’s used to looking at data, or a veteran who has followed the auto industry for many years, you probably won’t look only at this glamorous overall picture—you’ll lift the lid and see what’s actually inside it.

First, the severe split among Chery’s five major brands. Aside from the core brand Chery, with March sales of 163,507 units and a year-over-year increase of 38.8%, the other brands that had been heavily expected were almost all in full-scale collapse.

Star Track, defined as a premium brand, sold only 5,220 units in March, a year-over-year plunge of 46.3%, and its first-quarter performance fell even further by 39.9%. This means Star Track’s monthly sales are not even as high as some newer power brands’ sales of a single car within a single week.

What’s worrying is that Star Track has changed leadership frequently in recent years. Since the Star Track brand was established in 2018, by 2025 it has undergone seven core management adjustments, with the average executive tenure less than 1.5 years. From being Chery’s earliest premium brand to later becoming an independent business unit, it has never managed to find its own sense of presence.

Another former “dark horse” that also went silent—Jetour—likewise underperformed. Jetour sold 49,160 units in March, down 9% year over year; first-quarter sales fell 22.6%.

You should know that Jetour has long been Chery’s volume and traffic hitter, once breaking through by relying on value for money and the “travel + concept.” But now, with competitors cutting prices and competition intensifying, Jetour’s advantage in cost-effectiveness is being quickly eroded.

The worst case has been Zhijie in partnership with Huawei. In March it sold only 2,579 units, down 74.2% year over year; first-quarter sales were 8,030 units, down 75.7%, almost a cliff. Zhijie was once seen as Chery’s hope to benchmark Tesla and Wei Xiaoli (Huawei’s partners Weilai, XPeng, Li Auto—commonly referred to in Chinese as “Weilai, XPeng, Li Auto”) in the new energy track, but reality delivered a resounding slap to Chery.

A set of data reveals a harsh truth: Chery’s multi-brand strategy is failing. Star Track, Jetour, iCAR, Zhijie—all appear to cover every segment from low-end to high-end, from fuel to new energy. But in reality, they not only haven’t formed a synergy; instead, they are fighting over limited resources and market space.

Behind the sales decline is growing doubt about product strength. Since this year, problems and controversies around Chery’s new models have erupted in clusters:

The Fengyun A9L has been complained by owners for “a level-4 battery fault,” and the vehicle directly entered a limping mode;

The Fengyun T9 has been accused of seriously overstating its pure-electric range—advertised 120 kilometers, but in practice it can only run just over 60 kilometers;

The Arrizo 8 PRO was reported to have a battery draining problem three times within two weeks after delivery;

Even the Tiggo 7 was recalled 1,108 units due to improper engine wiring harness assembly.

A chain of issues points to internal management and quality control. Chery treats “being fast” as an important goal and “overtime” as the standard configuration for striving. The exhaustion of frontline workers, the rough handling of supply chain management, and perfunctory quality checks will all end up reflected in the vehicles ultimately delivered to consumers.

03

Far more than just a single storm

Many people ask: what direct relationship do a company’s management culture and overtime system have with sales declines and product quality control?

Let’s look at one detail first: in the sexual harassment incident, the executive Jiang Wenbo—who was the subject of the complaint—was described as having a style of being “domineering” and “arrogant.” And behind this style, there is often a brutal management logic: responsible to superiors, responsible to results, and especially not responsible to human nature—nor to subordinates.

This kind of logic is not uncommon within Chery’s system. Chery once tried to imitate Huawei’s wolf-like culture, and even set up the “Kaiyang Laboratory” in an attempt to benchmark Huawei’s “2012 Laboratory.”

But the problem is that Chery only learned Huawei’s wolf-like culture, not Huawei’s profit-sharing and incentives. Huawei’s Striver Agreement clearly lays out, in black and white, the responsibilities and rewards. Meanwhile, Chery’s “896” model leaves only employee complaints and attrition.

The Economic Daily News (The Economic Information Daily) previously reported that for a new hire at Chery, after joining for half a year, the average monthly working hours were 300 hours, with a salary of 4,800 yuan; the hourly wage was only 16 yuan, and after working for a full year, 70% would leave.

In 2025, Chery reorganized the intelligentization center, integrating entities such as Xiongshi and Dazhuo, forming a research and development team of nearly 2,500 people. But at the same time, two executives at Dazhuo Intelligent—Gu Junli and Zhang Xiaohong—resigned one after another, and even the CTO of Kaiyang Laboratory, Shang Jin, also left.

Such a high turnover rate is nothing short of disastrous for a manufacturing company that needs technical accumulation and stable operations.

Why has Chery’s premiumization strategy repeatedly been thwarted? Why has Star Track become less and less noticeable the more it’s built? Why has Zhijie fallen off a cliff? The root cause is the lack of a talent team capable of continuously delivering high-quality products. Without a stable core team, there is no stable R&D system; without a stable R&D system, there is no strong product strength; without strong product strength, the only option is to rely on low-end fuel vehicles and exports to drive volume—falling into a vicious cycle where higher volume brings less profit, less profit makes it harder to invest in R&D, and so on.

Therefore, this sexual harassment incident, on the surface, looks like a moral issue; in reality, it is a snapshot of Chery’s management culture.

If an organization remains in a long-term anxiety that performance is everything, and managers’ power is not constrained while employees at the grassroots have their rights ignored, then ultimately this distorted management culture will trigger a chain reaction. Employees’ physical and mental health will be harmed; the organization’s efficiency will decline; innovation will stall; and products will end up “planting mines.”

These problems are worth worrying about more than any single bout of sales decline. Because sales can be pulled back through price cuts, but once people’s hearts are scattered, they can never be gathered again. For Chery, the “sexual harassment” storm in 2026 may be a rare health check. What Chery needs to do is not just to apologize, but to prove with actions that this long-established automaker truly is willing to stop, fix its “car,” and then set off again.

Feikan Finance and Economics

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