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Dividend distribution of 800 million, with 1.5 billion still on the books - well-funded Geli Technology makes fourth attempt at IPO
AI JieLi Technology’s IPO repeatedly fails and fights on, why is its internal control stubbornly difficult to fix?
On March 20, Zhuhai JieLi Technology Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “JieLi Technology”) will face the 29th review meeting of the Beijing Stock Exchange’s Listing Committee in 2026. This chip design company, which bears the national “Manufacturing Single Champion” title, has about 1.5 billion yuan in cash on its books and an asset-liability ratio of less than 8%.
This is not JieLi Technology’s first attempt to enter the capital market. Since its establishment in 2010, the company has launched four IPO attempts, from the Shanghai Stock Exchange Main Board to the Shenzhen GEM, and now to the Beijing Stock Exchange. The proposed fundraising amounts have fluctuated from 586 million yuan, 2.5 billion yuan, 1.008 billion yuan, to the latest draft of 681 million yuan.
Behind its persistent efforts to go public, JieLi Technology’s performance heavily depends on a single white-label Bluetooth earphone chip, with nearly 70% of wafer procurement controlled by a single supplier, Huahong Group. Despite holding huge cash reserves and frequently paying large dividends (over 800 million yuan in total), the company still insists on raising funds.
Moreover, issues such as employees using personal accounts for company payments, sales personnel “reselling” products, former executives suing for unpaid wages, and long-standing infringement disputes cast a shadow over its internal controls.
Stubborn IPO Pursuit
As a company focused on system-on-chip (SoC) design, JieLi Technology’s main products include Bluetooth earphone chips, Bluetooth speaker chips, and smart wearable chips, widely used in consumer electronics. In the so-called “white-label” (non-branded) audio chip market, JieLi Technology holds a significant market share.
Despite its industry foundation, its IPO journey has been exceptionally rocky.
In March 2017, JieLi Technology first submitted its prospectus to the China Securities Regulatory Commission, aiming to list on the Shanghai Main Board, with a fundraising target of about 586 million yuan. However, due to a patent dispute with its former partner Zhuhai Jianrong and serious internal control issues uncovered during review, the company voluntarily withdrew its application.
In October 2018, it applied for a second time on the Shanghai Main Board. During subsequent checks, the CSRC found that the chaotic financial management issues from the first submission still existed. The company was notified and transferred for investigation, and the second IPO attempt failed.
In September 2021, JieLi Technology shifted to the Shenzhen GEM, with a significantly increased fundraising target of 2.5 billion yuan, and attracted prominent shareholders like Xiaomi and Huahong. However, during on-site supervision, irregular cash flows and weak internal controls re-emerged. In the second half of 2022, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange issued regulatory letters, and the third IPO attempt also failed.
At the end of 2024, JieLi Technology filed for a fourth time, choosing the Beijing Stock Exchange, with an initial proposed fundraise of 1.008 billion yuan. In the latest draft of its prospectus, this figure was reduced to about 681 million yuan. Four filings over nine years, with arbitrary changes in fundraising targets, have raised questions about its true capital needs.
The core doubt lies in its extremely healthy financial condition. Financial data shows that as of the end of December 2025, JieLi Technology had 1.467 billion yuan in cash, plus 865 million yuan in large certificates of deposit and term deposits, totaling over 2.3 billion yuan in liquid assets. The company has no short-term or long-term loans, and its latest asset-liability ratio is only 7.77%.
Despite such abundant funds, JieLi Technology has not hesitated to distribute large dividends to shareholders. According to the prospectus and public disclosures, since seeking listing, the company has paid out a total of 869 million yuan in cash dividends. During the reporting period for the Beijing Stock Exchange attempt (2022 to the third quarter of 2024), the company distributed dividends three times, with amounts of about 99.62 million yuan, 200 million yuan, and 100 million yuan respectively. Considering that the four founding partners hold over 63% of the shares, most of this huge dividend has flowed into the controlling shareholders’ pockets.
On one hand, the company has over 1.5 billion yuan in cash and continues to pay large dividends to major shareholders; on the other hand, it keeps adjusting its fundraising amount and insists on raising money from the secondary market. This financial logic has become a core issue that the Beijing Stock Exchange’s review committee cannot ignore.
Dependence on Major Clients and Single Products
JieLi Technology’s rise is closely tied to the explosive growth of the white-label Bluetooth earphone market.
The prospectus shows that Bluetooth earphone chips are the company’s absolute revenue pillar, accounting for over 40% of total revenue for a long period. However, this core product category is currently facing declining volume and prices.
In 2025, JieLi Technology’s revenue was 2.804 billion yuan, down 10.12% year-on-year; net profit was 596 million yuan, a sharp decline of 24.74%. In the first three quarters of 2025, when industry peers like Broadcom and Tailing Micro saw their profits double, JieLi Technology’s profits declined against the trend. Its main Bluetooth earphone chips sold 1.077 billion units in 2025, down 11.71% year-on-year.
Additionally, fierce competition in the white-label market has caused the unit price of this product to fall for several consecutive years, with some key models dropping over 10%. Slow product iteration and reliance on “price-to-quantity” strategies to maintain market share have directly led to a decrease in gross profit margin from 35.77% in 2024 to 30.32% in the first half of 2025.
On the sales side, JieLi Technology’s sales model has repeatedly drawn regulatory scrutiny. The company classifies many downstream vendors (such as Shenzhen Xinwenduo Electronics, its largest customer), which have no manufacturing capacity and only engage in chip trading and solution design, as “direct sales customers.” This approach, which effectively treats agents as direct customers, allows revenue recognition upon chip delivery, bypassing regulatory requirements that stipulate revenue can only be recognized after end sales.
In the supply chain, as a fabless design company, JieLi Technology’s production depends almost entirely on Huahong Group. During the reporting period, the top five suppliers accounted for about 90% of procurement. In the first half of 2025, procurement from Huahong Group alone accounted for 68.29%.
Such a dependence on a single supplier—nearly 70%—poses a high risk in the chip design industry. Any fluctuations in Huahong Group’s capacity, pricing, or international trade environment could directly impact JieLi Technology’s production and costs.
Persistent Internal Control, Investigation, and Litigation Issues
Obstacles to JieLi Technology’s listing include not only its poor performance but also longstanding internal control problems and disputes.
In each IPO attempt, using personal bank accounts for company payments has been a recurring compliance issue. Between 2015 and 2016, large amounts of sales and procurement funds were processed through the controlling shareholder and employees’ personal accounts. During the second IPO attempt in 2018, the CSRC found this problem persisted, leading to investigation and warning letters. During the third attempt in 2022, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange again identified abnormal cash flows and weak internal controls.
In the current Beijing Stock Exchange inquiry, detailed scrutiny of fund flows remains a focus. The exchange requires the company to explain the sources and destinations of large transactions involving key management and sales personnel. However, JieLi Technology responded by requesting exemptions from disclosure for transactions exceeding 1.5 million yuan and for some personnel’s roles in other companies.
While procedural, this approach deepens market doubts about whether the company is engaging in benefit transfer or revenue inflation through employee accounts.
Furthermore, the exchange directly pointed out that the company has sales personnel engaging in “reselling” between customers and downstream clients for profit. Such channel arbitrage not only distorts pricing but also exposes major flaws in the company’s sales management and anti-bribery supervision mechanisms.
Historical lawsuits and disputes also continue to haunt the company. The core controlling team and technical backbone mostly come from Zhuhai Jianrong. Between 2012 and 2018, Jianrong sued JieLi Technology three times for infringement of trade secrets and patents. Although the disputes were settled with an 8 million yuan payment (with a post-listing payment and earn-out clause), concerns about the legality of core technology sources remain.
In March 2024, former CFO and secretary Li Hantao sued JieLi Technology for dividends owed. The company explained that “since November 2022, attempts to contact Li Hantao through various channels have failed.” During the IPO critical period, a key former executive resorted to litigation to claim dividends, again highlighting internal governance issues.