加密数字货币交易所-《论语》详解：给所有曲解孔子的人-子曰：“性相，近也；习相，远也

Confucius said: “Human nature is inherently similar; habits make them different.”

Yang Bojun: Confucius said: “People’s innate nature is similar; because of different habits, they become vastly different.”

Qian Mu: The master said: “A person’s innate nature is similar; it becomes distant due to habits.”

Li Zehou: Confucius said: “Human nature is originally similar; customs make it distant.”

Kang Youwei: Later generations say that human nature is very diverse. The scholars believe that there are good and evil in human nature. If one nurtures and develops the good in human nature, goodness will grow; if one nurtures and develops the evil, evil will grow. Mi Zi Jian, Qi Diao Kai, Gongsun Nizi and their followers all say that human nature has good and evil. Mencius says human nature is good; Xunzi says human nature is evil; Gao Zi says human nature has no good or evil; Yang Zi says good and evil are mixed— all are mired in discussions of good and evil. Confucius, however, does not speak of good or evil, but of proximity and distance.

Detailed explanation:

The usual parsing is “Human nature is similar; habits make them different.” Under this parsing, the explanations of the first three are quite similar, but none are as comprehensive as Kang Youwei’s. Kang’s interpretation emphasizes that human nature should not be mired in good or evil, and the focus of this chapter is on the words “near” and “far.” What is “human nature”? According to the “Collected Explanations” and “Imperial Annotations”: “Human nature is what one is endowed with at birth,” meaning that human nature is what is bestowed upon and innate to humans—that is, it is innate, pre-existing. “Collected Explanations” and “Imperial Annotations” further explain that all humans are endowed with the qi of Heaven and Earth to be born; although there are differences in thickness and thinness, since they all inherit qi, they are called “similar.” In other words, this innate foundation is defined as “the qi of Heaven and Earth.”

This explanation inevitably faces the difficult question: Are chickens, ducks, geese, rabbits, and so on, also born from the qi of Heaven and Earth? Clearly, within this explanatory framework, the answer is affirmative. Then, by the same logic, human nature and the nature of chickens, ducks, geese, rabbits, etc., are also similar. If this explanation holds, its greatest contribution is that it can immediately explain why so many people on the street seem to easily become like chickens, ducks, and geese— is it because human nature is inherently similar to that of chickens, ducks, and geese? More seriously, even if we accept that humans have innate animal natures, by the same logic, the animal nature and the material nature of stones and debris are also similar. In this case, the so-called human nature can only be attributed to material nature. Then, discussing innate human nature becomes meaningless; if human nature is just material nature, why specifically discuss human nature at all?

And discussing non-human innate nature a priori also faces the same problem: if a person has no nature, then what is a person? Since humans are similar to material nature, how do we distinguish humans from other objects? In fact, from a priori perspective, whether we affirm or deny anything, difficulties will arise. The most laughable among those who think they can escape difficulties by negation is probably Popper, who claims to have completely defeated Marx. His so-called “falsification principle” is considered clever by himself, but in my view, it is not worth much. Falsification and verification are actually two sides of the same coin; any activity based on verification presupposes the existence of what can be verified. Correspondingly, when a proposition is falsified, it also proves that within the set of propositions, the correct ones are contained in the complement of the falsified proposition. Popper’s “falsification principle” is logically equivalent to the a priori assumption of the existence of a set of verifiable propositions and that correct propositions are assumed to be within this set. Moreover, according to the so-called “falsification principle,” a problem arises: the falsifiability of the principle itself. When Popper treats falsifiability as a scientific principle, his own theory’s scientificity is shaken.

Any a priori logic must face such difficulties. Confucius, like Marx, rejects all a priori principles, including the tricks of figures like Popper who try to reinvent them. Not understanding this point makes it impossible to understand the so-called “human nature is similar; habits make them different.” All four of the above explanations, and all common explanations, are fundamentally flawed for this reason. In fact, this chapter follows from the previous chapters. “Not to worry” has no rank; “worry” is ranked because of “not to worry” with no rank. The rank of “worry” is not based on any a priori or innate premise; “not to worry” is not an a priori or innate premise of “worry.” “Not to worry” is simply the stage where “worry” emerges. Existence must have its “worry”; “not to worry” does not exist and is not a theoretical assumption—if it did exist in theory, it would no longer be “not to worry.” “Not to worry” is not a premise; the premise of “worry” can only be the current reality, that is, “worry” itself.

The correct parsing should be: Confucius said: “Human nature is similar; habits make them different.” “Similar” (相), in the fourth tone, has its rank; accordingly, there is a rank corresponding to its position, and seeking an abstract, a priori rank outside of this is impossible. “Near” (近), means entanglement or attachment; its relation is that it must be entangled with its nature—can this be called “nature”? “Nature” (性), arises from the heart; the heart perceives “worry” as “not to worry,” which is the origin of “nature” and “nature is similar,” thus “near,” and it arises from entanglement. All theories that are purely theoretical cannot escape this “similarity of nature.” As Marx pointed out, philosophers and others still take it upon themselves to interpret the world, and this vicious cycle of “similarity of nature” will never end. The world is not for explanation; it is for change. Marx said so, Confucius said so: “Worry” is ranked because of “not to worry” with no rank, and different practical levels are ways humans change the world. From this, the world of “not knowing” becomes the world of “not anger,” and so on.

What is “habituation”? It is the beginning of the Analects’ “learning and practicing.” “Relation” (相), because of “having” worry about its “worry,” and humans can “learn” and “clarify” only the various “relations” at different levels. Apart from “relation,” there is no “innate” or “a priori” “nature” after “relation.” “Relation” and “learning” it are not about creating various so-called “theories,” but about “practicing” and “learning” its “relation.” The fundamental purpose of “learning” is to change the world—to “not relate” its “relation” and manifest a new “relation,” to align with Heaven and its timing, with Earth and its advantages, and with human harmony. “Far” (遠), means profound and deep. Truly profound and deep is “practice,” is change, not the lamentations and sophistry of bookworms.

But it must be pointed out that this does not deny the value of any theory; rather, it affirms the value of all theories. The value of a theory is shown through its “not to worry” that has no value; the value of a theory is in its “no value.” The “no value” of a theory’s “not to worry” is entanglement with the “worry” of reality; thus, theories are entangled and display different levels, and their levels are entangled with the levels of reality. If this entanglement is a one-to-one logical relationship, then it is no longer entanglement. The so-called reality cannot be separated from a certain theoretical perspective; to absolutize reality and turn it into some kind of a priori, innate premise is equally laughable. If reality were truly an a priori, innate premise, where would change come from? Theories at different levels can also appear within the same level of reality and show their levels; conversely, using theories at the same level can produce different levels of reality and show their levels. This is the true “worry” of theories entangled with the “worry” of reality; this is the true level of theories entangled with the levels of reality. Only in this way can one truly understand what entanglement is, and what “human nature is similar” means.

Marx said, “Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.” Confucius said: “Human nature is similar; habits make them different.” These two great minds collide again profoundly in this chapter.

Plain translation of the Zen in the Market.