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Imagine an extreme scenario - in 2026, major global economies join forces to pressure centralized exchanges to close withdrawals, and leading stablecoin issuers are forced to freeze their assets. In this storm, different stablecoin projects will have vastly different outcomes.
Traditional USDT and USDC face a fatal weakness: their smart contracts are built with administrative permissions. Blacklisting features, global pause switches, and freezing mechanisms—these "backdoors" were originally designed for risk control and compliance, but in extreme circumstances, they also mean that censorship and freezing can be executed instantaneously. Hundreds of billions of dollars in assets can be turned into immovable "electronic waste" with the push of a button.
In contrast, some stablecoin projects have adopted aggressive decentralization schemes. They directly destroy or distribute management authority at the code level—no blacklists, no pause switches, no freezing functions. This means that even if the project party or DAO wants to cooperate with regulation, they are technically powerless. As long as the underlying public chains (such as TRON, Ethereum, BSC) are operating normally, these stablecoins can flow freely on-chain.
This is a watershed moment in the design philosophy of stablecoins: should we prioritize the convenience of centralized risk control, or fundamentally eliminate single points of failure? Each approach comes with its costs. The former sacrifices censorship resistance, while the latter implies an inability to respond quickly to bad debts or violations. However, under extreme policy shocks, the vulnerabilities of the former become glaringly evident.